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## UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

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### **Personal Information**

Date of Birth: October 29th, 1991  
Citizenship: Brazil

### **Graduate Studies:**

PhD., Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2016-2023 (expected)  
Thesis Title: "Information Flows in Society"

### **Masters Level Work:**

M.A., Economics, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), 2014-2016

### **Undergraduate Studies:**

B.A., Economics, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), 2010-2013.

### **Thesis Committee and References:**

Andrew Postlewaite (Advisor)  
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**Research Fields:**

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Economics

**Teaching Experience:**

*Instructor at University of Pennsylvania:*

Fall, 2018                    *Statistics for Economists (Undergraduate)*

Summer 2019, 2020   *Math Camp (Graduate)*

*Instructor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas:*

January 2015                *Math Camp (Graduate)*

*Teaching Assistant (TA) at University of Pennsylvania:*

Fall, 2022                    *Game Theory (Undergraduate, Wharton)*, TA for Prof Joseph Harrington

Spring, 2019                *Game Theory (Undergraduate)*, TA for Prof Steven Matthews

Spring, 2018                *Macroeconomics I (Graduate)*, TA for Prof Dirk Krueger

Fall, 2017                    *Macroeconomics II (Undergraduate)*, TA for Prof Guillermo Ordoñez

*Teaching Assistant (TA) at Fundação Getúlio Vargas:*

Fall 2016                    *Strategic Competition (MBA)*, TA for Prof Erica Diniz

Fall 2016                    *Game Theory (MBA)*, TA for Prof Rafael Santos

Fall 2015, 2016              *Microeconomics III (Undergraduate)*, TA for Prof Lucas Maestri

Fall 2015                    *Microeconomics III (Graduate)*, TA for Profs Luis Braido and Andre Trindade

Fall 2015                    *International Trade (Undergraduate)*, TA for Prof Erica Diniz

Spring 2012                *Calculus II (Undergraduate)*, TA for Prof Izabel Camacho

**Research Experience and Other Employment:**

*Research Assistant (RA) at University of Pennsylvania:*

2018                        RA for Professor Annie Liang

2018                        RA for Professor Aislinn Bohren

2020-22                    RA for Professors George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite

## **Professional Activities:**

Presentations    Young Economist Symposium (2019), Pennsylvania Theory Conference (2022)

## **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

2019	Sidney Weintraub Memorial Fellowship in Economics for Outstanding Theory Student, University of Pennsylvania
2017	Best Macroeconomics Preliminary Exam, University of Pennsylvania
2016-2022	Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
2014-2105	CAPES Fellowship
2010-2013	EPGE Fellowship, Fundação Getúlio Vargas

## **Research Papers:**

### *“Social Learning with Heterogeneous Preferences”* (**Job Market Paper**)

I consider a model of social learning allowing for heterogeneous preferences. I show that heterogeneity of preferences is associated with public amnesia of information. I find a necessary condition for asymptotic learning for any non-trivial signal structure. Furthermore, I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic learning under any unbounded information structure. If such condition is not met, infinitely many players will be arbitrarily close to extracting zero value from observational learning. I show that the position of the prior may have consequences for asymptotic learning analysis

### *“A Puzzle on Informational Bubbles”* (draft available soon)

I consider a model in which at every period, an agent chooses another agent to sample from, establishing an information network. I show that there seems to be a trade-off between interpretability and novelty for the sampling decisions. I find that novelty plays a bigger role. This means that players should always prioritize to seek new, unfamiliar sources of information.

### *“To Bayes or Not To Bayes: Choosing How to Learn ”* (draft available soon)

I study an infinitely repeated zero-sum game with one informed agent (as in Aumann and Maschler 1968), in which the uninformed agent chooses which learning rule to follow. I show that the equilibrium learning rule follows a quasi-concavification pattern similar to Lipnowski and Ravid (2020), and I am able to quantify the value of learning rule flexibility. I discuss an application to algorithmic pricing.

### *“A Polynomial Algorithm of School Choice with Quotas”* (with Andrew Postlewaite and Rakesh Vohra) (work in progress)

We consider a student-school allocation problem with quotas for different groups. We propose an algorithm that is ex-post Pareto efficient and solvable in polynomial time.

**Language:** Brazilian Portuguese (native), English (fluent), French (advanced), Spanish (advanced), Hungarian (basic)

**Programming:** Python, SQL, R, MATLAB

