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PhD in Economics

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, PA. USA


Masters in Economics

Fundação Getúlio Vargas

Rio de Janeiro, RJ. Brazil


BA in Economics

Fundação Getúlio Vargas

Rio de Janeiro, RJ. Brazil

(Major in Economics, minor in International Relations)


Social Learning with Heterogeneous Preferences

I consider a model of social learning allowing for heterogeneous preferences. I show that heterogeneity of preferences is associated with public amnesia of information. I find a necessary condition for asymptotic learning for any non-trivial signal structure. Furthermore, I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic learning under any unbounded information structure. If such condition is not met, infinitely many players will be arbitrarily close to extracting zero value from observational learning. I show that the position of the prior may have consequences for asymptotic learning analysis.

A Puzzle on Informational Bubbles

I consider a model in which at every period, an agent chooses another agent to sample from, establishing an information network. I show that there seems to be a trade-off between interpretability and novelty for the sampling decisions. I find that novelty plays a bigger role. This means that players should always prioritize to seek new, unfamiliar sources of information.

To Bayes or Not To Bayes: Choosing How to Learn

I study an infinitely repeated zero-sum game with one informed agent (as in Aumann and Maschler 1968), in which the uninformed agent chooses which learning rule to follow. I show that the equilibrium learning rule follows a quasi-concavification pattern similar to Lipnowski and Ravid (2020), and I am able to quantify the value of learning rule flexibility. I discuss an application to algorithmic pricing.

A Polynomial Algorithm of School Choice with Quotas (with Andrew Postlewaite and Rakesh Vohra)

We consider a student-school allocation problem with quotas for different groups. We propose an algorithm that is ex-post Pareto efficient and solvable in polynomial time. 


Fall 2019


Statistics for Economics (ECON 103)

University of Pennsylvania

Summer 2019



Math Camp for Incoming PhD Students

University of Pennsylvania

2017 - 2019

Teaching Assistant

Macroeconomics I (PhD level)

Macroeconomics II (Undergraduate level)

Game Theory (Undergraduate level)

University of Pennsylvania, Econ Department

Fall 2022

Teaching Assistant

Game Theory (Undergraduate level)

University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business

2012 - 2016

Teaching Assistant

Microeconomic Theory III (Graduate level)

Game Theory (MBA level)

Strategic Competition (MBA level)

International Trade (Undergraduate level)

Microeconomic Theory III (Undergraduate level)

Calculus II (Undergraduate level)

Fundação Getúlio Vargas


Python, SQL, R, Matlab



Sidney Weintraub Memorial Fellowship


Best First-Year Macro Preliminary Exam
University of Pennsylvania


University of Pennsylvania Fellowship


CAPES Fellowship


EPGE Fellowship


Brazilian Portuguese (native)

English (fluent)

French (advanced)

Spanish (advanced)

Hungarian (basic)


Brazilian Citizen

US Green Card Holder

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